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The Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Pretty 











This manuscript discusses the JCPOA’s verification mechanism, especially its four innovative additional 
safeguards measures: much broader monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program, access with a deadline and 
dispute resolution mechanism, the Procurement Channel, and the prohibition of weaponization activities. 
It considers the possible implications of such safeguards measures for the future of the deal and for the 
non-proliferation regime. This manuscript found that the four additional safeguards measures, if 
implemented with the Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, would 
increase the effectiveness of monitoring and verification measures under the deal. In short, they will 
significantly contribute to the success of the deal. The deal is a success if its verification mechanism 
prevents Iran from producing weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade plutonium at its declared 
nuclear facilities for 10-15 years, and deters the country from building clandestine facilities to secretly 
produce those fissile materials. 
I. Introduction 
Iran and the EU3+3 – the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, Russia, and China – 
finalized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015. The deal intends to ensure 
that Iran’s civilian nuclear program can only be used toward peaceful ends, not for military purposes. In 
exchange, Iran will enjoy a wide-ranging suspension of sanctions from the U.S., European Union, and 
United Nations, including the unfreezing of approximately $100 billion of Iranian assets held mostly in 
Western financial institutions [1]. More than 70 nuclear non-proliferation specialists released a joint 
statement arguing that the deal “is a strong, long-term, and verifiable agreement that will be a net-plus for 
international nuclear non-proliferation efforts” [2]. A group of 29 nuclear scientists and engineers also 
showed their support for the deal through a letter addressed to President Barack Obama, stating that they 
believe the deal “meets key non-proliferation and security objectives and see no realistic prospect for a 
better nuclear agreement.” Moreover, three dozen retired generals and admirals, and more than 100 
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On the other hand, opponents of the JCPOA argue that the deal could give the potential for Iran to 
indigenously develop a nuclear weapon within 15 years and that tougher sanctions should be imposed. 
They believe that the deal’s snapback of sanction mechanism will not prevent continuous and minor 
violations that would allow Iran to gradually undermine the deal [4]. This article does not aim to 
specifically support or reject any arguments made by either proponents or opponents of the deal, nor does 
it aim to evaluate each of the deal’s terms. However, it is important to note that despite its debatable 
perfection and imperfection, the deal puts in place an unprecedented and multilayered monitoring and 
verification mechanism [5]. Therefore, this article aims to discuss the JCPOA’s verification mechanism, 
especially its advanced safeguards measures. It considers the possible implications of such safeguards 
measures for the future of the deal and for the non-proliferation regime. 
II. Advanced Safeguards Measures 
The verification mechanism under the JCPOA is advanced in nature. It consists not only of Iran’s 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
Additional Protocol, but also includes several advanced safeguards measures. Iran currently implements 
its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol as it did voluntarily 
from 2003 to 2006. The JCPOA requires Iran to ultimately ratify the Additional Protocol on Transition 
Day (18 October 2023), which is eight years after Adoption Day (18 October 2015), or the date on which 
the IAEA reaches the broader conclusion that all of Iran’s nuclear material is being used peacefully, 
whichever comes first. Iran’s adherence to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA is 
permanent. Once ratified, Iran’s Additional Protocol is also permanent as long as it does not withdraw 
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The advanced safeguards measures under the deal that will be further 
discussed below are not permanent, but will remain in effect for 10 to 25 years [6]. 
A. Broader Monitoring of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
Under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, Iran is required to declare the entire 
inventory of its nuclear material—the material’s capacity and location in Iran—and all activities 
involving nuclear material to the IAEA. Under the Subsidiary Arrangements stemming from Article 39 of 
Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, Iran has also agreed to accept the modified 
version of Code 3.1, which requires the country to provide a notice of a new nuclear facility to the IAEA 
as soon as it decides to build it. The modified Code 3.1 is a more enhanced measure than the original 
1976 Code 3.1 that required Iran to provide a notice “normally no later than 180 days before the facility is 
scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time.” This means that the modified Code 3.1 provides a 
better understanding of Iran’s nuclear plans and simplifies the process of planning safeguards measures 
for new facilities as they are being constructed. 
 
The Additional Protocol is more enhanced than Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the 
IAEA and requires Iran to provide additional information about its nuclear program and additional access 
to nuclear-related facilities to the IAEA. The Additional Protocol requires Iran to provide the agency with 
additional information on the sites of nuclear facilities and other sites normally related to nuclear material, 
nuclear material not otherwise regularly inspected by the agency under Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with the IAEA, main activities related to nuclear fuel cycle, and exports and imports of certain 
nuclear fuel cycle-related material and equipment. The Additional Protocol also provides information and 
access concerning the nuclear material (e.g., uranium mines, uranium ore processing, and yellow cake 
production) earlier than traditional safeguards measures. Under the Additional Protocol, the IAEA can 
demand access to any location at Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, and the Additional Protocol extended 
declaration through the complementary access provision with only short notice. The notification time for 
such access is two hours if the agency is already conducting an inspection at the location or design 
information verification and 24 hours in all other cases. The Additional Protocol also provides the IAEA 
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with access to undeclared nuclear facilities or related facilities (e.g., factories for enrichment components) 
if such access is needed to complete the agency’s verification work [7]. 
 
The JCPOA is even more enhanced and intrusive than Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with 
the IAEA and the Additional Protocol and will give the IAEA much broader access to Iran’s nuclear 
material, equipment, and facilities. The agency will have access to monitor Iran’s entire nuclear fuel cycle 
for 25 years, including its uranium mining at Gniche and Saghand, milling at Ardakan, and all of its 
uranium ore concentrate stocks that could be converted into uranium hexafluoride for enrichment at 
Isfahan. The agency will also have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing and 
research and development for 20 years. Such oversight includes access to Iran’s stocks of centrifuge 
rotors and bellows, which could be used to make new centrifuges, including the main equipment for 
centrifuge production such as low-forming machines, filament-winding machines, and mandrels [6]. 
 
Moreover, for 15 years, the IAEA will monitor the stored Iranian centrifuges and related infrastructure. 
During that time, Iran will provide the IAEA with daily access to all relevant buildings at Natanz—the 
only location where Iran is allowed to enrich uranium 235 up to 3.67% [6]. Such rigorous safeguards 
measures will considerably decrease the likelihood of clandestine activity because Iran would have to find 
another source of uranium for enrichment if it wished to secretly develop a nuclear weapon through a 
uranium pathway. These advanced safeguards measures on the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle seem to 
be the major innovation of the verification mechanism under the JCPOA.  
 
Another advanced safeguards measure under the JCPOA also will significantly block Iran from using 
plutonium to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has agreed to ship out its spent fuel for the lifetime of the 
reactor and has also agreed to redesign the Arak heavy water research reactor so that it is unable to 
produce large quantities of plutonium. Iran will sell all of its heavy water that is not needed for Arak to 
the international market for 15 years. Also, for at least 15 years, Iran is not allowed to build additional 
heavy water reactors or a reprocessing facility to separate plutonium from spent fuel [6]. Any effort to 
covertly produce or divert plutonium from Bushehr would be swiftly detected by the IAEA. The agency 
will have access to real-time monitoring of Iran’s heavy water production and stocks with more intense 
and efficient safeguards measures than the ones under the Additional Protocol to verify its compliance 
indefinitely. These physical restrictions on the production of plutonium, as argued by a number of nuclear 
scientists, will essentially shut down Iran’s abilities to use plutonium to develop a nuclear weapon [4, 8, 
9]. 
B. Access with a Deadline & Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Under Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, the IAEA can request access to 
Iran’s (and any other NPT States having the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA) 
undeclared nuclear facilities through a special inspection if the IAEA Director General believes that such 
access is necessary to verify the correctness and completeness of information submitted by Iran. The 
agency is obligated to consult with Iran when faced with situations or conditions that may lead to a 
special inspection. No deadline is established in Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the 
IAEA in solving disputes on special inspections between Iran and the agency, but the Director General 
will usually report the problem to the IAEA Board of Governors [4]. 
  
The Additional Protocol is more comprehensive than Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with 
the IAEA and gives broader access to the IAEA for asking follow-up questions and examining 
inconsistencies. In such a situation, the agency should give Iran the opportunity to answer the questions 
and explain the inconsistencies before it requests access, unless it believes that any delay would prejudice 
the purpose for which the access is requested. If Iran cannot provide the requested access, then the 
country is obligated to make every effort to fulfill the agency’s requirements through other means and 
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without further delay. The agency will then give Iran at least 24 hours’ notice before access occurs to give 
the country an opportunity to solve the issue by other means. Like Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with the IAEA, the Additional Protocol does not have a deadline for solving disputes on 
complementary access if Iran cannot provide access to the location requested by the agency [7]. 
 
Another advanced aspect of the JCPOA is that it contains an access with a deadline and dispute resolution 
mechanism that will last for 15 years. This mechanism improves the IAEA’s capability to acquire access 
to any undeclared facilities (including military facilities) within a defined time if the agency has concerns 
about certain materials or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA. After a request to access the suspected 
facility is made, the agency and Iran have 14 days to make arrangements for access or to decide on other 
means to solve the issue. If such efforts are ineffective, the issue is referred to the Joint Commission, 
which includes eight members: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, European Union, 
Russia, China, and Iran. The Joint Commission has seven days to find a solution either through a 
consensus or voting of five or more of its eight members, which means that the West has the ability to 
pass any decision. Iran then has three days to implement the Joint Commission’s decision. If Iran is found 
to be in non-compliance, the EU3+3 could decide to re-impose the sanctions [6]. 
 
Such access with a deadline and dispute resolution mechanism would be useful since it could 
considerably mitigate concerns regarding covert activities in Iran. The 24 days’ limit on any delay to 
access is unprecedented. The limit will allow inspections to covert enrichment, construction of 
reprocessing or reconversion facilities, and implosion tests using uranium [3]. Under the JCPOA, 
inspections and intelligence will work together. Information gathered by the IAEA inspectors will 
strengthen the assessment made by intelligence agencies, and intelligence data will help guide the IAEA 
inspections [4]. The 24 days’ limit, a deadline, and provisions for automatically re-imposing sanctions 
improve the agency’s special inspection provisions under Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol that have no deadline for action or penalty for Iran’s non-
compliance. 
C. Procurement Channel 
Another advanced safeguards measure under the JCPOA is a mechanism called the Procurement Channel, 
which is designed to monitor and control the supply of nuclear-related items to Iran. Under this 
mechanism, three categories of items will regularly be referred to the Procurement Working Group of the 
Joint Commission: Nuclear Suppliers Group’s Trigger List goods, non-listed goods with a nuclear utility, 
and Nuclear Suppliers Group’s dual-use goods [6]. However, dual-use components remain debatable 
despite different annexes issued by the IAEA. The missile's range and capability are still interpretable 
differently by both sides. The Procurement Working Group membership consists of one voting member 
each from Iran and the EU3+3, whereby the European Union High Representative will serve as the 
coordinator. If Iran wants to purchase any goods or materials that could be used for its nuclear program 
that are identified on established IAEA dual-use lists, the Procurement Working Group would need to 
review the request and authorize the purchases. 
 
Within the Procurement Channel mechanism, the suppliers must seek approval from their own 
governments, and the governments must forward the request to the Procurement Working Group and the 
United Nations Security Council. The Procurement Working Group has 20 working days (and an 
additional 10 working days by request) to make decisions regarding whether to approve or reject the sale 
of direct use, nuclear-related dual-use, or certain dual-use goods to Iran. It requires consensus to authorize 
exports to Iran. If no party objects, the proposal is then approved. If a disagreement within the 
Procurement Working Group ensues, two members can request referral of the case to the Joint 
Commission for consensus vote. The Joint Commission then has 10 days to decide, and the United 
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Nations Security Council must be notified of recommendation within 45 days of receiving the proposal 
[6].  
 
Under the JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group would also be permitted to conduct end-user checks 
to ensure that the materials ended up in the correct places. Moreover, the IAEA will have access to check 
the end use of direct-nuclear-use goods. The agency could check dual-use goods during safeguarding and 
ostensibly also invoke access provision in extreme cases. Combined with the complete inventory of the 
materials that Iran uses for its nuclear program, this end-user checks measure will help ensure a thorough 
accounting of dual-use materials to prevent diversion for a covert nuclear program [10, 11]. In other 
words, the Procurement Channel will help ensure that neither single- nor dual-use nuclear-related items 
could be diverted to any covert nuclear program in Iran. 
 
The country has committed to guarantee that all procurement of nuclear-relevant items, both for civilian 
and military purposes, will be procured through this mechanism, which will last for 10 years, and all 
restrictions will end on the Termination Day (18 October 2025). 
D. Prohibition of Weaponization Activities 
Another innovation under the JCPOA is the explicit prohibition of Iran’s nuclear weapons research and 
development, as opposed to merely nuclear weapons manufacture, as expressed in Article II of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Iran has also agreed to permanent restrictions prohibiting activities relevant to 
developing a nuclear explosive device. While Iran committed to not pursue nuclear weapons when it 
joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the JCPOA requires Iran to adhere to restrictions beyond its NPT 
obligations. The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not explicitly prohibit research or use of explosives 
suitable for nuclear weapons for non-nuclear purposes. Iran has never admitted such a military nuclear 
program and has denied all accusations. In its Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues 
regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program of 2 December 2015, the IAEA Board of Governors officially states 
that the agency “found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the 
possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program [12]. 
 
Under the JCPOA, Iran has also agreed to forgo computer modeling to simulate nuclear explosive 
devices, testing, developing, or acquiring multi-point explosives and neutron sources, as well as the 
design and development of nuclear explosive diagnostic systems [6]. While some of these activities are 
relevant for developing conventional explosives and for activities like drilling, in the future, if caught 
conducting research in these areas, Iran will not be able to claim that it is undertaking any such activities 
for non-nuclear purposes. As Squassoni [13] notes, unlike most safeguards agreements related to peaceful 
nuclear energy use, the JCPOA specifies prohibited nuclear weapons-related activities. However, the 
word “related” is not well defined, which has led to multiple interpretations, particularly related to Iran’s 
missile program. The addition of prohibition of weaponization activities is important to give the IAEA 
access to military sites, considering that access must be “exclusively for resolving concerns regarding 
fulfillment of JCPOA commitments” [6]. 
 
Furthermore, if some dual-use technology falls within the definitions regulated under Annex 1, Iran is 
mostly not allowed to use it for any purpose, even for civilian, non-nuclear research that other states 
would be allowed to conduct. As Acton [14] argues, it is possible that a disagreement over the 
interpretation of Annex 1 could exist, such as in deciding if a specific “multi-point explosive detonation 
system” was actually “suitable for a nuclear explosive device.” If such a disagreement did occur, a dispute 
resolutions mechanism through the Joint Commission could be used even though the JCPOA does not 
specify clearly that the Joint Commission is responsible for interpreting the meaning of “related” 
activities or dual-use goods. 
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III. Concerns 
Overall, the verification mechanism under the JCPOA provides the IAEA with considerably sufficient 
tools to verify declared facilities with great confidence that Iran is complying with the nuclear limits, as 
well as to detect and report in a timely manner any substantial diversion of nuclear material or use of 
undeclared material. The advanced measures prevent Iran from secretly using significant amounts of 
nuclear material from its declared facilities for secret nuclear activity without a high risk of detection. In 
other words, to build nuclear weapons secretly using highly enriched uranium, Iran would need to acquire 
or build a separate and secret fuel cycle, including a secret source of natural uranium, a secret conversion 
facility to produce uranium hexafluoride, and a secret enrichment plant to produce highly enriched 
uranium, plus secret facilities to produce uranium metal and fabricate nuclear weapons components. Such 
development is not impossible, but seems very unlikely if the IAEA and the EU3+3 intelligence agencies 
continue to effectively monitor Iran’s nuclear program. 
 
However, the verification mechanism under the JCPOA is not perfect. As many nuclear experts note, the 
JCPOA requires Iran to declare its entire stock of centrifuges, but the IAEA may not be able to verify that 
Iran has declared all of its centrifuges and other sensitive uranium enrichment equipment. Many key dual-
use manufacturing equipment and materials are also used for Iran’s military program, particularly its 
ballistic missile program [4]. Therefore, it is possible for Iran to secretly use key dual-use manufacturing 
equipment and materials for its covert centrifuge production in the future. 
 
Another concern, as noted by Rockwood [15], is that Iran may have undeclared equipment and materials 
that might be used for undeclared uranium enrichment, not just the diversion of equipment and materials 
that the IAEA is already aware of. Therefore, it seems difficult to confirm and verify that Iran is not 
retaining additional centrifuges over and above those declared or testing centrifuges on a small scale at an 
undeclared facility. Although difficult, such verification is not impossible. While there are also debates 
about whether such verification is within the scope of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with 
the IAEA, it is certainly not beyond the agency’s statutory authority to carry out such verification if the 
United Nations Security Council requests that it do so. In fact, the IAEA has performed such verification 
work related to weaponization in the past, such as in Iraq, Libya, and South Africa [15]. 
 
Furthermore, there is also a possibility that Iran would build or acquire equipment or materials secretly on 
the black market. That is, Iran might attempt to circumvent the Procurement Channel. Such concern 
seems reasonable considering that its nuclear program has been built mostly using imported material, 
equipment, and technology from other countries illegally [11]. Iran has also publicly bragged about its 
capability to circumvent sanctions aimed at blocking its ability to enrich uranium 235, as well as publicly 
stated the intention to illegally acquire it for missile and other military programs. For example, during a 
televised address to the nation on 30 August 2014, President Rouhani stated, “Of course we bypass 
sanctions. We are proud that we bypass sanctions, because the sanctions are illegal” [16]. Moreover, The 
Iranian Special Commission tasked with approving the nuclear deal on 4 October 2015 also reported, 
“The Islamic Republic of Iran’s government has said that it does not intend to implement sections of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 that compromise defense and national security” [17]. If 
Iran decides to continue its illicit trade, then it will be violating the JCPOA. Thus, such non-compliance 
might result in sanctions related to its nuclear program being re-imposed. 
IV. A Modest Recommendation 
After looking at the advanced safeguards measures and how they complement Iran’s Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol, as well as discussing the reasonable 
concerns, there are two steps that should be taken to ensure the success of the JCPOA. First, besides 
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relying on its own sources of information, the IAEA should work together with private intelligence 
agencies, considering the false intelligence information given to the IAEA concerning the nuclear military 
program of other states that had been proven wrong as the case for Iraq, North Korea, and Syria. The 
IAEA is indeed effective at verifying compliance at declared facilities, but intelligence agencies are more 
capable and experienced in detecting covert activities. 
 
Second, the EU3+3 should take the lead in ensuring that the IAEA has all of the additional technology, 
human, finance, and other resources necessary to complete its additional tasks under the JCPOA. The 
EU3+3 should also strongly encourage other states to share the resources burden. Such distribution is 
important because the deal would place a significant additional workload on the agency, especially its 
safeguards directorate, which is already stretched thin. Unfortunately, as Persbo [18] notes, many member 
states have been reluctant to support the agency’s proposal for budget increases. On 25 August 2015, 
Director General Yukiya Amano requested additional resources from the agency’s Board of Governors. 
He estimated that the agency would need approximately $10.6 million or €9.2 million per year: 3 million 
euros for provisional implementation of Additional Protocol; and 6.2 million euros for verification and 
monitoring work under the deal [19]. On the same day, the Board of Governors authorized Amano “to 
undertake the verification and monitoring” of Iran’s nuclear-related JCPOA commitments “subject to the 
availability of funds and consistent with our standard safeguards practices” (Amano, 2015b).  
 
The IAEA receiving the full support that it needs to permit enhanced safeguards measures in Iran. As the 
agency gains experience with a more intensive and intrusive verification regime in Iran, it may be able to 
apply the experience to safeguards in other states in the future. A comprehensive and efficient monitoring 
and verification mechanism can improve the global non-proliferation regime since it will increase 
confidence in the regime’s capability and credibility in detecting and responding to non-compliance. 
V. Conclusion 
The verification mechanism under the JCPOA is advanced because it consists not merely of Iran’s 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol, but also of four 
advanced safeguards measures. The four advanced safeguards measures include much broader monitoring 
of Iran’s nuclear program, access with a deadline and dispute resolution mechanism, the Procurement 
Channel, and the prohibition of weaponization activities. These advanced safeguards measures, if 
implemented with Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Additional 
Protocol, will increase the effectiveness of monitoring and verification measures under the deal. In short, 
they will significantly contribute to the success of the deal. The deal’s success can be measured by its 
verification mechanism preventing Iran from producing weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade 
plutonium at its declared nuclear facilities for 10-15 years, and deterring the country from building 
clandestine facilities to secretly produce weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. 
 
If Iran cheats, as it were, as many are concerned, the IAEA would become aware promptly through such a 
comprehensive verification mechanism under the deal, and sanctions might snap back. In undertaking 
such intensive, intrusive, and multilayered monitoring and verification mechanism under the deal, the 
IAEA should work carefully with no political interference with the private intelligence agencies and 
should be equipped with all necessary resources. If the agency’s work in verifying the implementation of 
the deal is effective, it will increase the confidence level in the global non-proliferation regime and will 
considerably strengthen the credibility of the regime itself. The agency may then also be able to apply 
lessons identified in relations with Iran to safeguards in other countries in the future. 
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